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1Summary
We study an economy where there are two types of assets. Consumers'
promises are the primitive defaultable assets secured by collateral chosen by
the consumers themselves. The purchase of these personalized assets by ¯-
nancial intermediaries is ¯nanced by selling back derivatives to consumers.
We show that nonarbitrage prices of primitive assets are strict submartin-
gales, whereas nonarbitrage prices of derivatives are supermartingales. Next
we establish existence of equilibrium, without imposing bounds on short sales.
The nonconvexity of the budget set is overcome by considering a continuum
of agents.
Keywords: Endogenous Collateral; Non Arbitrage.
21 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Housing mortgages stand out as the most clear and most common case
of collateralized loans. In the past, these mortgages were entirely ¯nanced
by commercial banks who had to face a serious adverse selection problem in
addition of the risks associated with concentrating investments in the hous-
ing sector. More recently, banks have managed to pass these risks to other
investors. The collateralized mortgage obligations (C.M.O.) developped in
the eighties and nineties are an example of a mechanism of spreading risks
of investing in the housing market. These obligations are derivatives backed
by a big pool of mortgages which was split into di®erent contingent °ows.
Collateralized loans were ¯rst addressed in a general equilibrium setting
by Dubey, Geanakoplos and Zame [9]. Collateral was modelled by these au-
thors as a bundle of durable goods, purchased by a borrower at the time
assets are sold and surrendered to the creditor in case of default. Clearly, in
the absence of other default penalties, in each state of nature, a debtor will
honor this commitments only when the debt does not exceed the value of the
collateral. Similarly, each creditor should expect to receive the minimum be-
tween his claim and the value of the collateral. This pionnering work studied
a two-period incomplete markets model with default and exogenous collat-
eral coe±cients and discussed also the endogenization of these coe±cients,
allowing for some coe±cients to prevail in equilibrium, out of a possible ¯nite
set of strictly positive values, but for a ¯xed composition in terms of durable
goods. Araujo, P¶ ascoa and Torres-Martinez [5] extended the exogenous col-
lateral model to in¯nite horizon economies with one-period assets and showed
that Ponzi schemes can be avoided without imposing transversality or debt
constraints.
Araujo, Orrillo and P¶ ascoa [3] studied existence of equilibria in an econ-
omy where borrowers may choose collateral bundles under the restriction
that the value of the collateral, per unit of asset and at the time when it is
constituted, must exceed the asset price by some arbitrarily small amount
exogenously ¯xed. Under this requirement the loan can only ¯nance up to
some certain fraction of the value of the house. Lenders were assumed not
3to trade directly with individual borrowers, but rather to buy obligations
backed by a weighted average of the collaterals chosen by individual borrow-
ers, with the individual sales serving as weights. Borrowers sell at di®erent
prices depending on the collateral choice, as there is a spread which is a dis-
counted expectation of default given in the future. Hence, borrowers choose
the composition of the collateral in terms of durable goods and the collateral
margin (which is not necessarily equal to the exogenous lower bound as more
collateral reduces the spread).
However, the model su®ered from three important drawbacks that we try
to overcome in the current paper. First, short sales were bounded due to
the above exogenous lower bound on the di®erence between the value of the
collateral and the asset price ( in fact, ¯rst period budget feasibility implies
that short sales must be bounded by the upper bound on endowments di-
vided by the exogenously ¯xed lower bound on the di®erence between the
value of the collateral and the asset price). It is hard to accept the existence
of an exogenous uniform upper bound on the fraction of the value the house
that can be ¯nanced by a loan.
Secondly, the payo®s of the derivative were constructed in a way that im-
plied that in equilibrium, in each state of nature, either all borrowers would
honor their debts or all borrowers would default (even though the collateral
bundle might vary across borrower). In fact, derivative's payo®s were as-
sumed to be the minimum between the debt and the value of the depreciated
weighted average of all collateral bundles. If we require, as we do in this
paper, that the derivative's payo® in each state is just the weighted average
of borrowers' repayments (which may be the full repayment of the debt for
some borrowers or the value of the depreciated personalized collateral for
others), then, in equilibrium, some borrowers may default while others will
pay back their loans.
Third, derivative aggregate purchases were required to match, in units,
aggregate short-sales of primitive assets, but this equality should only be
required in value. That is, each ¯nancial intermediary should be ¯nancing the
purchase of the consumers' promises on a certain primitive asset by issuing
the respective derivative, thereby making zero pro¯t at the initial date (and
also at any future state of nature due to the above requirement that the
4derivative's endogenous payo® should be the weighted average of consumers'
e®ective repayments).
1.2 Results and Methodology
It is well known that in incomplete markets with real assets equilibrium
might not exist without the presence of a bounded short sales condition (see
Hart [14] for a counter-example and Du±e and Shafer [10] on generic exis-
tence). In a model with exogenous collateral this bounded short sales condi-
tion does not need to be imposed arbitrarily but it follows from the fact that
collateral must be constituted at the exogenously given coe±cients. An im-
portant question is whether existence of equilibria may dispense any bounded
short sales conditions in a model with endogenous collateral. Presumably,
the fact that the borrower holds and consumes the collateral may discourage
him from choosing the collateral so low that default would become a sure
event. We try to explore this fact to show that, in fact, defaulting in every
state is incompatible with the necessary ¯rst order conditions governing the
optimal choice of the collateral coe±cients. From here we derive an argument
establishing that equilibrium levels of the collateral coe±cients are bounded
away from zero and, therefore, equilibrium aggregate short sales are bounded.
Allowing borrowers to choose their collateral bundles introduces a non-
convexity in the budget set, which is overcome by considering a continuum
of agents. This large agents set is actually a nice set up both for the huge
pooling of individual mortgages and for the spreading of risks across many
investors. However, for a continuum of agents, having established that ag-
gregate short sales are endogenously bounded does not imply that the short
sales allocation is uniformly bounded. To handle this di±culty we appeal to
the di®erentiability and strict concavity of the utility function. As collateral
coe±cients were already shown to be bounded from below (uniformly across
agents), if short sales were not uniformly bounded, then the collateral bundle
would become arbitrarily large, for some sequence of borrowers, and the re-
spective marginal utility of consumption would tend to zero. It is shown that
this would contradict ¯rst order conditions. Then, short sales allocations are
endogenously uniformly bounded, as desired to prove existence using a multi-
dimensional version of Fatou's lemma applied to a sequence of equilibria of
truncated auxiliary economies whose bundles and portfolios are bounded.
51.3 Arbitrage and Pricing
The existence argument uses a pricing formula suggested by a study of
the nonarbitrage conditions for asset pricing in the context of a model where
purchases of the collateralized derivatives and sales of individual assets yield
di®erent returns. This nonarbitrage analysis was absent in the earlier work
by [3], where budget feasible short sales were bounded.
Our analysis of the nonarbitrage conditions is close to the study made by
Jouini and Kallal [16] in the presence of short sales constraints. In fact, the
individual promises of homeowners are assets that can not be bought by these
agents and the collateralized derivatives bought by investors is an asset that
can not be short sold by these agents. These sign constraints determine that
purchase prices of the the collateralized derivatives follow supermartingales,
whereas sale prices of homeowners promises follow submartingales. Actually,
the latter must be strict submartingale when collateral is consumed by bor-
rowers, since short sales generate utility returns also, and in this respect, our
analysis di®ers from [16].
The nonarbitrage conditions identify several components in the price of
a consumer's promise: a base price common to all consumers, a spread that
depends on the future default, a positive term re°ecting the di®erence be-
tween current and future collateral values, a nonnegative tail due to the sign
constraints and a negative tail on the sale price due to utility returns from
consumption of the collateral. We also show that the price of the minimal
cost superhedging strategy is the supremum over all discounted expectations
of the claim, with respect to every underlying probability measure (and sim-
ilarly, the price of a maximal revenue subhedging strategy is instead the in-
¯mum over those expectations, in the spirit of the Cvitani¶ c and Karatzas [7]
and El Karoui and Quenez [12] approaches to pricing in incomplete markets).
In equilibrium agents will face price functions, as in [3], rather than price
vectors. More precisely, we propose price formulas both for the primitive
assets and the derivatives which are suggested by our arbitrage analysis. The
state prices entering in these equilibrium price functions and the negative tail
of the primitive asset prices are both taken as given and common to all agents.
That is, equilibrium prices of derivative or primitive assets are given by super
6or sub martingales, respectively, with respect to a common measure, but can
also be written as super or sub martingales for consumer speci¯c measures
implied by the personal choice of collateral and e®ective returns (namely
using the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers as de°ators).
1.4 Relation to Other Equilibrium Concepts
We close the paper with a discussion of the e±ciency properties of equi-
libria. We show that an equilibrium allocation is undominated by alloca-
tions that are feasible and provide income across states through the same
given equilibrium spot prices, although may be ¯nanced in the ¯rst period
in any other way (possibly through transfers across individuals). This re-
sults extends usual constrained e±ciency results to the case of default and
endogenous collateral. An implication is that the no-default equilibrium, the
exogenous collateral equilibrium or even the endogenous collateral equilib-
rium with bounded short sales are concepts imposing further restrictions on
the welfare problem and should be expected to be dominated by the proposed
equilibrium concept.
In this paper we simplify the mixing of individual promises by assum-
ing that each collateralized derivative mixes the promises of all sellers of
a certain primitive asset. Since the collateral choice personalizes the asset
the resulting derivative represents already a signi¯cative mixing across as-
sets with rather di®erent default pro¯les. Further work should address the
composition of derivatives from di®erent primitive assets and certain chosen
subsets of debtors. We do not deal also with the case of default penalties
entering the utility function and the resulting adverse selection problems.
The penalty model was extensively studied by Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shu-
bik [8], extended to a continuum of states and in¯nite horizon by Araujo,
Monteiro and P¶ ascoa [1, 2] and combined with the collateral model by [9].
Our default model di®ers also from the bankruptcy models where agents do
not honor their debts only when they have no means to pay them, or more
precisely, when the entire ¯nancial debt exceeds the value of the endowments
that creditors are entitled to con¯scate (see Araujo and P¶ ascoa [4]).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model
of default and collateral choice. Sections 3 and 4 address arbitrage and
7pricing. Section 5 presents the de¯nition of equilibrium and the existence
result. Section 6 contains the existence proof and Section 7 discusses the
e±ciency properties. A mathematical appendix contains some results used
in the existence proof.
2 Model of Default and Collateral Choice
We consider an economy with two periods and a ¯nite number S of states
of nature in the second period. There are L physical durable commodities
traded in the market and J real assets that are traded in the initial period
and yield returns in the second period. These returns are represented by a
random variable R : S 7! I RJL such that the returns from each asset are not
trivially zero. In this economy each sale of asset j (promise) must be backed
by collateral. This collateral will consist of goods that depreciate at some
rate Ys depending on the state of nature s 2 S that occurs in the second
period.
Each seller of assets chooses also the collateral coe±cient for the di®erent
assets that he sells and we suppose that the mean collateral coe±cients can
be known by consumers. For each asset j denote by Mj 2 I RL
+ the choice
of collateral coe±cients. The mean collateral coe±cients will be denoted by
C 2 I R
JL
+ . Each agent in the economy is a small investor whose portfolio is




+ , where the ¯rst and second components are the purchase
of the derivative and sale of the primitive assets, respectively. The collateral
bundle choosen by borrower will be M' and his whole ¯rst period consump-
tion bundle is xo + M'.
Denote by xs 2 I Rl
+ the consumption vector in state of nature s. Agent¶s
endowments are denoted by ! 2 I R
(S+1)L
++ . Let ¼1 and ¼2 be the vectors
of purchase prices of the derivatives and of sale prices of primitive assets,
respectively. Then, the budget constraints of each agent will be the following










psYsMj'j + psYsxo; 8s 2 S (2)
8Here Dsj ´ minfpsRj
s;psYsMjg and Nsj are what he will paid and received
with the sale and purchase of one unit of the primitive asset j and one unit
of its derivative, respectively. Now we will represent equations (1) and (2) in
matrix form:
p 2(~ x ¡ !) · A(xo;µ;') (3)
where ~ x = (0;x1;:::;xS), ! = (!o;!1;:::;!S), p 2(~ x ¡ !) is the column










¡po ¡¼1 ¼2 ¡ poM
p1Y1 N1 p1Y1M ¡ D1
p2Y2 N2 p2Y2M ¡ D2
¢ ¢ ¢
¢ ¢ ¢









3 Arbitrage and Collateral
Now we will de¯ne arbitrage in our context where both sales of collateral-
ized assets and additional purchases of durable goods have utility returns that
have to be taken into account together with pecuniary returns. Moreover,
agents' preferences are assumed to be monotonic.
De¯nition 1 We say that there exist arbitrage opportunities if
9 Mj > 0; j = 1;::;J; µ ¸ 0 and (xo;') such that










Notice that even when there are no pecuniary net returns and zero net cost
the agent may still gain from the utility returns of consuming durable goods,
serving or not as collateral, that is, through a collateralized short sale ('j >
0) or a non ¯nanced purchase (xo > 0).
9Theorem 1 There are no arbitrage opportunities if and only if there exists
¯ 2 I R
S
































Let B = fT(xo;µ;') : µ ¸ 0g and ~ B = fT(xo;µ;') : µ = 0g, which are a




Absence arbitrage is equivalent to K \ B = f0g. By the theorem of sep-
aration of convex cones, we have that K \ B = f0g if and only if 9f 6= 0
linear: f(z) < f(y); 8z 2 B;y 2 Knf0g.
Now f(z) = 0; 8z 2 ~ B, since ~ B is a linear subspace. Then f(y) >
0; 8y 2 Knf0g and it follows that f(z) · 0 8z 2 B. Hence 9 (~ ®; ~ ¯; ~ ¹; ~ ´) >>
0 : f(v;c;xo;') = ~ ® + ~ ¯c + ~ ¹xo + ~ ´' · 0; 8(v;c;xo;') 2 B. Take
¯ = ~ ¯=®; ¹ = ~ ¹=® and ´ = ~ ´=®, and we have (5) when (xo;') = 0. To











¯spsYs + ¹: ¥
Comment
Durable goods prices (p0) and net prices (p0Mj¡¼
j
2) of the joint operation of
constituting collateral and short-selling a primitive asset are both superlinear
functions of pecuniary returns, by the Theorem above, due to the additional




2 > 0 when Mj 6= 0; 8j
Since short-sales lead to nonnegative net yields in the second period (once
we add the depreciated collateral to returns) and also to consumption of the
collateral bundle in the ¯rst period, nonarbitrage requires the net coe±cient
of short-sales in the ¯rst period budget constraint to be positive.
If we had considered the collateral as being exogenous, we would have
the following result:
Corollary 2 There are no arbitrage opportunities if and only if there exists

















¯spsYs)Cj > 0; and poCj ¡ ¼
j > 0; 8j 2 J:
For more details on the implications of the absence of arbitrage in the
exogenous collateral model see Fajardo [13].
In contrast with the fundamental theorem of asset pricing in frictionless
¯nancial markets, we can obtain an alternative result for the default model
with collateral where discounted nonarbitrage asset prices are no longer mar-
tingales with respect to some equivalent probability measure. This result is
presented in the next section.
4 Pricing
4.1 A Pricing Theorem
Let I R be the real line and I R = I R [ f¡1;+1g the extended real line.
Let ­ = f1;2;::;Sg, (­;F;P) be a probability space and X = I R
S. We say
11that f : X 7! I R is a positive linear functional if 8 x 2 X+; f(x) > 0, where
X+ = fx 2 X/P(x ¸ 0) = 1 and P(x > 0) > 0g. The next result follows





2 ¡ poMj < 0; 8j which will be refered to as the net sell price
and let Dsj = Dsj ¡ psYsMj; 8j and 8s.
Denote by ¶(x) the smallest amount necessary to get at least the payo®
x for sure by trading in the underlying defaultable assets. Then no investor
is willing to pay more than ¶(x) for the contingent claim x. The speci¯c
expression for ¶ is given by
¶(x) = inf
(µ;')2£
f¼1µ ¡ ¼2' > 0
.








Theorem 2 i) There are no arbitrage opportunities if and only if there
exist probabilities ¯¤
s; s = 1;::;S equivalent to P and a positive ° such
that the normalized (by °) purchase prices of the derivatives are super-
martingales and the normalized (by °) net sale prices of the primitive
assets are submartingales under this probability. when the collateral is
consumed by the borrower, the net sale price is a strict submartingale
ii) Let Q¤ be the set of ¯¤ obtained in (i) and ¡ be the set of positive linear
functionals » such that »jM · ¶, where M is a convex cone representing
the set of marketed claims. Then there is a one-to-one correspondence













where E¤ is the expectation taken with respect to ¯¤









(i) Let ¯o =
PS
s=1 ¯s and ¯¤
s =
¯s







































2 ¡ p0Mj are super and sub martingales, respectively.
Now, if there is a probability measure and a process ° such the nor-













· °[¼1µ ¡ ¼2']
Then there can not exists arbitrage opportunities.












it is a continuous linear functional. Since ¯¤ is equivalent to P and














· °[¼1µ ¡ ¼2']
we have » 2 ¡.
Now take » 2 ¡ and de¯ne ¯¤(B) =
PS
s=1 ¯¤
s1B(s) = »(1B). Since S is
13¯nite, ¯¤ is equivalent to P.
Now since »(1S) = 1, we have ¯¤(S) = 1 =
PS
s=1 ¯¤
s, so ¯¤ is a proba-
bility.
(iii) By part (ii) take a » 2 ¡ then 8x 2 M
»(x) · ¶(x) ) ¡»(¡x) · ¶(x)
then replacing x by ¡x we have
»(x) ¸ ¡¶(¡x)
Hence
clf»(x)=» 2 ¡g ½ [¡¶(¡x);¶(x)]
For the converse, ¡¶(¡x) = ¶(x) the proof is trivial. Then we suppose
that ¡¶(¡x) < ¶(x). Now it is easy to see that ¶ is l.s.c. and sublinear.
Then the set K = f(x;¸) 2 M £ I R : ¸ ¸ ¶(x)g is a closed convex
cone. Hence 8² > 0 we have that (x;¶(x) ¡ ²) = 2 K. Applying the
strict separation theorem we obtain that there exist a vector Á and
there exists real number ® such thatÁ¢(x;¶(x)¡²) < ® and Á¢(x;¸) >
® 8(x;¸) 2 K. Then we can rewrite these inequalities as:
Áo ¢ x + ÁS+1(¶(x) ¡ ²) < ®
Áo ¢ x + ÁS+1¸ > ® 8(x;¸) 2 K
where Áo = (Á1;:::;ÁS) and, since K is a convex cone, we must have
® < 0. This implies Áo ¢ x + ÁS+1(¶(x) ¡ ²) < 0 and Áo ¢ x + ÁS+1¸ ¸
0 8(x;¸) 2 K. Hence ÁS+1 > 0 and we can de¯ne º(x) = ¡
Áo
ÁS+1 ¢ x.
It is easy to see that º is a continuous linear functional and º(x) ·
¶(x); 8x 2 M, since (x;¶(x)) 2 K. Also º(x) > ¶(x) ¡ ². Now for all
x 2 X+, we have º(¡x) · ¶(¡x) · 0, so º(x) ¸ 0. With an analoguous
argument, we obtain º0(x) 2 ¡ such that º0jM · ¶ and
¡¶(¡x) · º
0(x) · ¡¶(¡x) + ²
Since fº 2 ¥=ºjM · ¶g is a convex set and fº(x)=ºjM · ¶ ; º 2 ¡g is
an interval we obtain the inclusion.¥
14Remark
² Our de¯nition of maximal willingness to pay ¶(x) is in the spirit of
the super replication approach of [12] and [7] to pricing in incomplete
markets. We consider as superhedging strategies the defaultable assets.
Theorem 2, (ii) establishes a one to one correspondence between linear
pricing rules, bounded from above by ¶(x), and measures ¯¤, considered
in the sub and supermartingale pricing formulas














In this section borrowers (sellers of assets) will choose the collateral coe±-
cients. We assume that there is a continuum of agents H = [0;1] modeled by
the Lebesgue probability space (H;B;¸). Each agent h is characterized by
his endowments !h and his utility Uh. Each agent sells in the initial period
J assets that will be backed by a chosen collateral bundle and purchases also
the derivatives; in the second period will receive the respective returns.
The allocation of the commodities is an integrable map x : H ! I R
(S+1)L
+ .
The derivative purchase and primitive assets short sale allocations are rep-
resented by two integral maps; µ : H ! I R
J
+ and ' : H ! I R
J
+, respectively.
Each borrower h will choose the collateral coe±cients for each portfolio sold
.The allocation of collateral coe±cients chosen by borrowers is described by
the function M : H ! I R
J
+.
Consumers short-sell and collateralize the primitive assets but can only
buy a derivative issued by a ¯nancial intermediary that buys the primitive
assets. The value of the derivative's aggregate purchases must match the
value of the primitive asset's aggregate short-sales (and the value of the ag-
gregate respective returns should also be equal in any state of nature in the
future). Each buyer of assets (lender) will take as given the derivatives' pay-
o®s Nsj and a mean collateral coe±cients vector C 2 I RJL




S) be the commodity consumption in the several states of
the world in the second period.
Sale prices of primitive assets are assumed to consist of a base price
minus a discounted expected value of future default plus a term re°ecting the
collateral requirements (which entail a cost but yield a depreciated collateral
bundle) and an addicional negative tail ±j ´ ¡(p0 ¡
P
s °spsYs)Cj which is
independent of the collateral choice. More speci¯cally we assume




+ + (po ¡
X
s
°spsYs)(Mj ¡ Cj) (8)
The state prices °s are common to all agents and taken as given together
with the base price q. The vector of prices for the collateralized derivatives,
whose returns are given by Ns, is ¼1j. We will show that for an asset j which
is traded we have qj =
P


















(x;µ;';M) 2 I R
L(S+1)+2J+JL : (1) and (2) hold for
¼2 given by (8)g


























































































² Equations (10) and (11) are the usual market clearing conditions. Equa-
tion (12) says that in equilibrium the anonymous collateral coe±cient
Cj is anticipated as the weighted average of the collateral coe±cients
allocation Mj.
² Equation (13) says that aggregate yields of each derivative must be
equal to aggregate actual payments of the underlying primitive assets.
This implies that aggregate default su®ered must be equal to aggregate






















jdh 8s 2 S; 8j 2 J
Where Sj
s = fh 2 H : psRj
s > Nsjg is the set of agents that su®ered
default in state of nature s on asset j and Gj
s = fh 2 H : psRj
s >
psYsMh
j g is the set of agents that give default in state of nature s on
asset j. Note that Sj
s is equal to H or Á, since psRj
s and Nsj do not
depend on h.
² The above equilibrium concept portraits equilibria in housing mort-
gages markets where individual mortgages are backed by houses and
17then huge pools of mortgages are split into derivatives.
In our anonymous and abstract setting, any agent in the economy may
be simultaneously a homeowner and an investor buying a derivative.
The above equilibrium concept assumes the existence of J ¯nancial
institutions, each one buying the pool of mortgages, written on prim-
itive asset j; from consumers at prices ¼h
2j and issuing the respective
derivative, which is sold to consumers at prices ¼1j. These ¯nancial
institutions make zero pro¯ts in equilibrium both at the initial date
and at any future state of nature.
To simplify, we mix promises of di®erent sellers of a same asset but
do not mix di®erent assets into derivatives. This simpli¯cation is not
too strong, since di®erent sellers of a same asset end up selling person-
alized assets due to di®erent choices of collateral. A more elaborate
model should allow for the mix of di®erent primitive assets and for
the strategic choice of the mix of assets and debtors by the issuer of
the derivative. Putting together in a same model the price-taking con-
sumers and investments banks composing the derivatives strategically
may be a di±cult task, since the latter would have to anticipate the
Walrasian response of the former.
We will now ¯x our assumptions on preferences.
Assumption (P) : preferences are time and state separable, monotonic, rep-
resentable by smooth strictly concave utility functions uh such that the map
ruh : H £ I R
(S+1)L
+ ! I R is jointly continuous and ruh(x) ! 0 uniformly
in h as kxk ! 1.
Theorem 3 If consumers's preferences satisfy assumption (P) and the en-
dowments allocation ! belongs to L1(H;I R
(S+1)L
++ ), then, there exist equilibria
where borrowers choose their respective collateral coe±cients.
6 Proof of the Existence Theorem
Let us ¯rst address the case where bundles and portfolios are bounded
from above. More precisely, non¯nanced consumption bundles xh, portfolios
18(µh;'h) and collateral coe±cients Mh
j are bounded by n in each coordinate.
Then we will let n go to 1.
Truncated Economy
De¯ne a sequence of truncated economies (En)n such that the budget set












L(S+1)+2J+JL : (1) and (2) hold g
We assume that C 2 [0;n]LJ.
Generalized Game
For each n 2 N we de¯ne the following generalized game played by the
continuum of consumers and some additional atomic players. Denote this
game by Jn which is described as follows:
² Each consumer h 2 H maximizes Uh in the constrained strategy set
Bh
n(p;q;¼1;C;°):





















































19² Another ¯ctitious agent chooses ¼1j 2 [0;1];qj 2 [0;° maxs;k Rsjk];

















































This game has an equilibrium in mixed strategies (see lemma 8) and, by
Liapunov's Theorem (see lemma 9), there exists a pure strategies equilibrium.
Now let us de¯ne a free disposal equilibrium for the truncated econ-
omy as a pair consisting of a price vector (p;¼1;°;C;N) and an allocation
(x;µ;';M)H) such that (x;µ;';M)(h) maximizes consumer h's utility Uh on












































Lemma 1 For n large enough, there exists a free-disposal equilibrium for the
truncated economy.
20Proof:
Let z = (xh;µh;'h;Mh) : H ! [0;n]L(S+1)+2J+LJ, (po;q;¼1;°, ps;C) be








In fact, the equality holds trivially when
R








jdh · n and therefore Cj can be chosen in [0;n] to






2'hdh, (2) qj =
P
s °spsRsj when R
H µh
jdh 6= 0, (3)
R
H µhdh = 0 i®
R




jdh 6= 0 the ¯nancial intermediary chooses ¼1j 2 [0;1] and
° 2 [0;°]




























j = 0 for a.e. h but
R
H µh
jdh 6= 0, then Nj and ¼1jare set equal to
zero, implying that µh
j could be instead set equal to zero, for a.e. h, without




jdh = 0 the ¯nancial intermediary sets ° so that p0 ¸
P
s °spsYs
and makes qj =
P
s °s(psRsj ¡ psYsMj)+ implying
¼
h






s °spsYs all borrowers choose 'h
j = 0 and when p0 >
P
s °spsYs
all borrowers choose Mh

























In fact, these inequalities hold as equalities when
R
H µh








jdh does not exceed n; for every s. Other-
wise, the strict inequalities hold in (1) for some s and in (2).¤




















o)dh · 0 (16)












o)dh · 0;8s 2 S (17)
For n larger enough, we must have pol > 0;8l 2 L. Otherwise, every con-
sumer would choose xh
ol = n and we would have contradicted (15) But when









h)l)dh = 0 8l 2 L (18)
since the aggregate budget constraint of the ¯rst period is a null sum of non
positive terms and therefore a sum of null terms.¥





n)fh2Hg);pn;¼1n;qn;°n;Cn;Nng be the sequence
of free-disposal equilibria corresponding to En. Let n ! 1 and examine the
asymptotic properties of the sequence.
Lemma 2 pn
sl 9 0 8s;l
Proof:
Income in each state of the second period is the value of the bundle
!h
s + Ysxo (which is bounded away from zero in each coordinate) plus an
additional income equal to Nsjµ+psYsM'¡
P
j Dsj'j ¸ 0. Since preferences
are time and state separable and monotonic, for any s and any l we have
pn
sl 9 0. In fact, even in the presence of an unbounded increase in income,
possibly o®setting the increase in xsl for an inferior good, the expenditure in
some commodity would have to grow unboundedly and therefore kxhn
sl k ! 1
22for every h;implying that the feasibility equations would be violated for n
su±ciently large. This completes the proof of this lemma.¥
The sequences fMhn
jl gn and fChn
jl gnadmit (maxs;k;j R
j
sk)=(mins pslYsl) as
an upper bound. In fact, any choice of collateral coe±cients beyond this
bound determines sure repayment and would be equivalent to constituting
collateral just up to this bound and consuming the remaining in the form of
a bundle not serving as collateral (that is, as part of xn
0).
Lemma 3 Cn
j 6! 0 as n ! 1. Actually, there exist uniform positive lower








j g be the set of states where agent










6= ; 8 h;j for n large enough, when asset j is traded. Other-
wise the Kuhn-Tucker ¯rst order condition in Mjl (which is necessary since




¸o 'j · 0, which is impossible.














each n, 8h, Mhn
j 2 T n
j and Cn
j 2 conT n
j : Notice that for n large enough
pn
sl 6= 0 and therefore 0 = 2 conT n
j . De¯ne the corresponding sets at the cluster
point (ps)S
s=1 À 0 : Tsj =
©
z 2 I Rl






must have the cluster point Cj of the sequence Cn
j belonging to conTj which








n)dhg is a bounded sequence.
23Proof:

























o)dh;8s 2 S: (19)
























oldh;8l 2 L (21)
Then, by lemma 3,
R
H 'h
njdh is bounded. ¥
Lemma 5 The aggregate purchase of the derivative can also be taken as
bounded, along the sequence of equilibria for the truncated economies.
Proof:
Let N(n) = maxs Nn
sj and use the homogeneity of degree -1 of demand








1j=N(n) and e µhn
j = µhn
j N(n). Then, e Nn
sj has a clus-
ter point also,8s and actually, passing to a subsequence if necessary, e Nn
sj is



























j dh 9 1.
In the rest of the proof, to simplify the notation, let us take µn to be
actually the allocation e µn.¥
24Lemma 6 the sequence of allocations fxon;µng is uniformly bounded.
Proof:






the hypothesis of the weak version of Fatou's Lemma. Therefore 9z integrable
such that
z
h 2 clfzn(h)g for a.e h
Notice also that pn;¼1n;qn;°n have cluster points.This implies that zh is
budget feasible at (p;q;¼1;°;C;N) = limn!1(pn;qn;¼n
1;°n;Cn;Nn), passing
to a subsequence if necessary . Moreover, (xh;µh;'h;Mh) maximizes Uh
at the cluster point of (pn;qn;°n;Cn;Nn), for almost every h. This is a
consequence of the fact that consumers' optimal choice correspondences are
closed (see appendix).
Individual optimality at the cluster points implies that pn
0l 9 0 (l =
1;:::;L)l and ¼n























Lemma 7 The short sales allocation is also uniformly bounded
Proof:












































































j ! 1. In a nondefault state,
we have (u0




¹ h(yn) = 0, by assumption (P) and Moore's





o 9 0, since ¯rst period wealth pn
o!o 9 1 (recall short sales
induce a net cost).







again, by assumption (P). Now let





















and let Ã(Mj) = minfpsYsMj;psRsjg. Since the jacobian of the budget
constraints with respect to x is of rank S, the ¯rst order condition on Mj is





































where ºh(n) 2 @MjÃ = conflimrÃ(zi) : zi ! Mj; zi 2 dom(rÃnO)g,













! 0. Then we must have °n
s ! 0 for s 2 S2.


































So the claim is established.2




































That is qj =
P
s °spsRsj + (po ¡
P
s °spsYs)Cj in the limit, but qj must
be less than
P
s °spsRsj + (po ¡
P
s °spsYs)Cj. Otherwise any agent could
make poMh
j ¡¼2h
j = 0 for Mh
j su±cient small but di®erent from zero so that
default occurs in every state. Such a choice for Mh
j would be accompanied
by choosing 'j arbitrary large, which can not occur since there is a ¯nite op-




jng is uniformly bounded and, from (2), fxh
slng is also uni-
formly bounded. All these facts imply that the sequence (xn;µn;'n;Mn'n)
is uniformly bounded.
We can now continue the proof of existence of equilibria for the economy
E using the strong version of Fatou's lemma (see Appendix):
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j dh > nN(n). If N(n) < n, then the inequality would
hold as equality. If N(n) = n, then n2 R
H µhn





j dh = n
R
H µhn



















j dh ! 0, but
the former implies the latter, since we would have ¼h
2j = p0(Mj ¡ Cj) which
would lead every agent to choose Mh
j ¸ Cj;8h, and, therefore, Mh
j = Cj,
implying that ¼h
2j = 0 and 'h





































In this section we prove that an equilibrium allocation is constrained e±-
cient among all feasible allocations that provide income across states through
the same spot prices (the given equilibrium prices). In comparison with the
equilibrium obtained by [3], we can say that our equilibrium is Pareto supe-
rior, since we are not impossing any kind of bounded short sale.
As in the work of Magill and Shafer [18], we compare the equilibrium
allocation with one feasible allocation whose portfolios do not necessarily
result from trading competitively in asset markets. That is, in alternative
allocations agents pay participation fees which may di®er from the market
portfolio cost. Equivalently, we allow for transfers across agents which are
being added to the usual market portfolio cost.
Proposition 1 Let ((x;µ;';M);p;¼1;¼2;C;N) be an equilibrium. The al-
location (x;µ;';M) is e±cient among all allocations (x;µ;';M) for which
there are transfers T h 2 I R across agents and a vector C 2 I RJL



















































j; 8s; a:e: h
(iii) po(xh
o + Mh'h ¡ !h
o) + ¼1µh ¡ ¼2'h + T h = 0
(iv)
R









where the equilibrium prices are given by





¼2 = q ¡
X
s
°sg2s + (po ¡
X
s





Suppose not, say (x;µ;';M;C) together with some transfer fraction T











'h;x¡o) for h in some positive measure














s = (psRs ¡ psYsM
h)
+'
h ¡ (psRs ¡ Ns)
+µ
h
= (psRs ¡ D
h
s)'
h ¡ (psRs ¡ Ns)µ
h
By continuity of preferences and monotonicity we can take G = H, without
loss of generality. Then
R
H gh



























29where the right hand side is strictly positive, contradicting R
H(xh
s ¡ !h
s ¡ Ys(Mh'h + xh
o))dh = 0 .¥
The above weak constrained e±ciency property is in the same spirit as
properties found in the incomplete markets model without default (see [18])
and also in the exogenous collateral model (without utility penalties) of [9].
As in these models, it does not seem to be possible to show that equilib-
rium allocations are undominated when prices are no longer assumed to be
constant at the equilibrium levels. However equilibria with default and en-
dogenous collateral, as proposed in this paper, is Pareto superior to the
no-default equilibria, to the exogenous collateral equilibria and even to the
bounded short-sales endogenous collateral equilibria of [3], since our equilib-
ria is free of any of the constraints which are used in the de¯nition of these
equilibrium concepts (that is, absence of default, exogeneity of collateral and
bounded short-sales).
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have obtained a no arbitrage characterization of the
prices of collateralized promises, where the collateral coe±cients are choosen
by borrowers as in [3]. We also obtained a pricing result consistent with the
observation made by [16] for the case of short sale constraints, more precisely
we have shown that our buy and net sell prices are supermartingale and sub-
martingales, respectively, under some probability measures. For these prob-
abilities we have found lower and upper bounds for the prices of derivatives
written on the primitive defaultable assets. Finally using the nonarbitrage
characterization of asset prices we proposed an equilibrium pricing formula
and showed the existence of equilibrium in the model where borrowers choose
the collateral coe±cients, without imposing uniform bounds on short-sales
(thus avoiding a drawback of the work by [3]) and showed that this equilib-
rium is constrained e±cient.
309 Appendix
9.1 Mathematical Preliminarities
² Let C(K) the Banach space of continuous functions on the compact
metric space K. Let L1(H;C(K)) be the Banach space of Bochner in-








Let B(K) denotes the set of regular measures on the Borelians of K.
The dual space of L1(H;C(K)) is L1
! (H;B(K)), the Banach space
of essentially strong bounded weak ¤ measurable functions from H
into B(K). We say that f¹ng ½ L1(H;B(K)) converges to ¹ 2
L1

















² We will use in this work the following lemmas ( in m-dimension).
Fatou's lemma (Weak Version)
Let ffng be a sequence of integrable functions of a measure space
(­;A;º) into I R
m
+. Suppose that limn!1
R
­ fndº exists. Then there
exists an integrable function f : ­ 7! I R
m
+ such that:
1. f(w) 2 clffn(w)g for a.e w, and
2.
R
­ fdº · limn!1
R
­ fndº
Fatou's lemma (Strong version)
If in addition the sequence ffng above is uniformly integrable, then the
inequality in 2. holds as an equality.
9.2 Extended Game
We extend the generalized game by allowing for mixed strategies both in
portfolios and collateral bundles. Remember that, for each player a mixed
strategy is a probability distribution on his set of pure strategies. In this
31case the set of measures on the Borelians of Kn = [0;n]J £ [0;n]J £ [0;n]LJ.
We denote by B the set of mixed strategies of each consumer. Since we are
not interested in a mixed strategies equilibrium, per se, we will extend the
previous game to a game J n over mixed strategies ( that we call extended
game) whose equilibria: 1) exist 2) can be puri¯ed and 3) a pure version is
an equilibrium for the original game. First, before extending the game to
mixed strategies, let us rewrite the payo®s of the ¯ctitious agents replacing





h) = arg maxfu
h : x
h 2 [0;n]
L(S+1) satis¯es (1) and (2)g
That is, function dh solves the utility maximization problem for a given
portfolio (µh;'h) and given collateral coe±cients Mh
j . By the maximum
theorem and the fact that consumers' choice correspondences are closed (see
Proposition below), dh is continuous. Secondly, we extend the payo®s to
mixed strategies.














































h for s 2 S


































































² Another ¯ctitious agent chooses ¼1j 2 [0;1];qj 2 [0;maxs;k Rsjk];Nsj 2































































Lemma 8 J n has an equilibrium, possibly in mixed strategies over portfolio
and collateral together.
Proof:
The existence argument in Ali Khan [17] can be modi¯ed to allow for some
atomic players. First, by the Proposition below, consumers' pure strategies
choice correspondences are closed, and therefore, upper semicontinuous in
the truncated economy. Now, mixed strategies choice correspondences are
the closed convex hull of the pure strategies choice correspondences and,
therefore, will be also upper semicontinuous.
Now, de¯ne the correspondence:
®(p;¼;C) = ff ´ (x;¹) 2 ([0;n]
L(S+1) £ B)
H : f(h) 2 º
h(p;¼;C)g
Which is also convex valued and upper semicontinuous . The best re-
sponse correspondences Ri of the r = S + 2 + JL ¯ctitious agents are con-
vex valued and upper semicontinuous on the pro¯le of consumers' proba-
bility measures on Kn (with respect to the weak * topology on the dual of
L1(H;C(Kn) ). The pro¯les set is compact for the same topology and Fan -
Glicksberg ¯xed point theorem applies to ® £
Qr
i=1 Ri: ¥
33Lemma 9 J n has an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof:
In this part Liapunov's theorem will be fundamental. First, notice that
the payo®s of the atomic players in J n depend on the pro¯le of mixed
strategies (¹h)h only through ¯nitely many e indicators of the form (e =











hdh where Ze 2 L(H;C(Kn))
Secondly, let Eh(p;¼;C) =
Q

















where the integral on the left hand side is the set in I R
e of the all integrals
of the form
R
Kn Zh(µh;'h;Mh)d¹h, for ¹h 2 Eh(p;¼;C). The integral on
the right hand side is de¯ned endogenously. The equality above follows by


























Then, given a mixed strategies equilibrium pro¯le (¹h)h, there exists
(µh;'h;Mh) such that the Dirac measure at (µh;'h;Mh) is an extreme point
of Eh (evaluated at the equilibrium levels of the variables chosen by the
atomic players ) and (µh;'h;Mh)h can replace (¹h)h and keep all equilibrium
conditions satis¯ed, without changing the equilibrium levels of the variables
chosen by the atomic players but replacing the former equilibrium bundles
by dh(µh;'h;Mh) .¥
349.3 Closedness of consumers' choice correspondences
Since p0 2 4L¡1 consumers' budget correspondence always has the origin as
an interior point of its values, implying that the interior of the budget corre-
spondence is lower-semicontinuous and, therefore, the budget correspondence
itself is also lower semi-continuous.
Lemma 10 The budget correspondence is lower semicontinuous .
Proof:
De¯ne Bh
o(p;q;°;C) to be the interior of Bh(p;q;°;C) and let xh = 0;
µh = 0;'h = 0 and Mh = 0. The values thus chosen for these variables satisfy
the budget constraint of agent h with strict inequality. So, Bh
o(p;q;°;C) 6= Á.
Let limk!1(pk;qk;°k;Ck) = (p;q;°;C) and (xh;µh;'h;Mh) 2 Bh
o(p;q;°;M).




































for k large enough, which implies that Bh
o is lower hemi-continuous. Then
the result follows from [15], pag. 26, fact 4.
It is immediate to see that budget correspondences of truncated economies
enjoy also the same property. Let us see that choice correspondences of
truncated economies are closed. Consumers' optimal choice correspondences
are closed at any (p;q;°;C) satisfying the assumptions of the previous lemma:
if (pk;qk;°k;Ck) ! (p;q;°;C), zk is an optimal choice of consumer h at
(pk;qk;°k;Ck) and zk ! z, given any z 2 Bh(p;q;°;C), 9(zk) ! z such that
zk 2 Bh(pk;qk;°k;Ck) and zk is not prefered to zk by consumer h, implying,
by continuity of uh that z is an optimal choice at (p;q;°;C).
Comment
Consider an economy where derivative and primitive asset aggregates are
also required to match in value ( but not in quantity) but collateral margin
35requirements are bounded from below, say p0Mh
j ¡ ¼2j ¸ ² (or that p0Mh
j ¡
qj ¸ ², as in [3]), when 'h
j > 0. Then, the lower semi-continuity of the
budget correspondence holds. In fact, taking p0 2 4L¡1 and ¼h
2j ´ qj ¡ P
s °s(psRsj ¡psYsMj)+ (that is, setting the negative tail in the equilibrium
sale price of primitive assets to be ±j ´ ¡(p0¡
P
s °spsYs)Mh
j ), the constraint
p0Mh
j ¡ qj ¸ ² is always well-de¯ned and admits an interior solution (with
Mh
j large enough) which is compatible with the interior solution (x;µ;') = 0
of the other budget constraints.
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